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Courts. Any cause of action which does not constitute an admi-
ralty cause, within the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, is not affected by the Constitution of the United'
States. The State legislation may provide new liens and new
remedies for such causes in all cases of vessels or parties coming
within its territory and thereby becoming subject to its laws. It
is simply a contradiction in terms to say that a cause which is not
an admiralty or maritime cause belongs exclusively to a jurisdiction
which is confined to such causes and can embrace no others.
I am of opinion that demurrers are well taken, and that the
pleas are bad.
The Chief Justice and IIAINES, J., concurred. VANDYE, J.,
dissented.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPPRME COURT OF MASSA OUSETTS.
r,te-Place of Contract-Statute of Limitations.-A note, dated in
this Commonwealth, and first delivered in this Commonwealth to the payee,
who resided here, is to be deemed a contract made here, and to be con-
strued according to the laws of this Commonwealth, although actually
siened in another State: Lawrence vs. Bassett.
A note is not barred by the Statute of Limitations, although oyerdue
fi)r more than six years, if it was given by a person i~h6 was once an
inhabitant of this Commonwealth, but has lived-oilt of the Commonwealth
ever since'the cause of action accrued: Id.
ANote- unaW.-If the maker of a note which is payable to his own
order indorses it and employs an agent who sells it for him for less than
its face, the transaction is usurious, although the purchaser supposes that
lid is merely purchasing the note in the -market, and does not know that
the seller is acting only as an agent: Sylvester vs. Swan.
I From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in volume 5 of his Reports.
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lNote- Common Carrer.-A common carrier who, by a written agree-
ment with the owner of notes, has undertaken to procure their renewal or
to return them, cannot excuse himself for the non-performance of his
undertaking by proving that an indorser, to whom he had delivered them
for examination and comparison prior to the renewal, was summoned as
trustee of a subsequent indorser, and thereupon. refused to give them up
or renew them: Wareham Bank vs. Burt.
Assault and Battery-Mitigation of Damages.--In aif action to recover
damages for an assault and battery, committed by the son of the owner
of a house, upon one who had wrongfully intruded into the same, but, in
compliance with orders given to him, had left the house and was going
away, evidence is incompetent to prove, in mitigation of damages: that the
plaintiff was of bad repute in the community, and was accompanied by his
paramour, who was also of bad repute in the community; although the
plaintiff's counsel, in opening his case, and throughout the trial, has claimed
damages on the ground that the assault and battery were an indignity,
calculated to injure the plaintiff's standing and reputation in the commu-
nity: Bruce vs. Priest.
Judge of Probate-Authority to revoke Decree.-A judge of probate
has no authority to revoke a decree passed by himself, making an allow-
ance to a widow out of her husband's estate, and to pass a new decree
allowing to her a less sum: Pettee vs. Wtmarth.
Insolvent Debtor-Execution- Title of Assignee.-A levy of an execu-
tion by a judgment-creditor upon the real estate of an insolvent debtor,
made after the first publication of notice of the issuing of the warrant, is
not valid against the title of the assignee, although the assignee has not
recorded the assignment in the county where the land lies, and although
the creditor has no actual notice of the insolvency: Hall vs. Whitton.
If a judgment-creditor of an insolvent debtor has levied his execution
upon the debtor's reversion of real estate, after the first publication of
notice of the issuing of the warrant, the assignee in insolvency may. main-
tain a bill in equity to set aside the levy: Id.
Insolvent Debtor-Homestead Exemption.-Those creditors of an insol-
ven' debtor, whose claims accrued before the passage of the statutes
creating a right of homestead, are entitled to have the whole amount which
has been realized by the assignee from the sale of the right of homestead,
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applied towards the payment of their claims, in priority to the general
creditors, and to take a dividend with the other e-editors for the balance
of their claims, if any. And the amount realized from the sale 'of the
reversionary interest in the land, after the expiration of the right of home-
stead, is to be distributed among the general creditors: Thie vs. Rice.
Town-Action against on Contract-Acce)tancc of Road- Couzinl" Com-
nissones.-In an action against a town to recover for work doi 'e under a
contract in building a road, the plaintiff undef a general 'coftnt may recover
the value of the work, provided it was done in good faith and is beneficial' •
to the defendants, although the contract has not been fully performed:
Reed vs. Inhabitants of Scituate.
If, in such action, the plaintiff sqeks to recover the contract price, on
the ground that the road has been accepted by the town, it is erroneous
to rule that, if the road was ordinarily used for travel by the public before
the time limited for its completion, with the knowledge and consent of the
selectmen or highway surveyors, it is competent for the jury to infer from
this fact that the town had adopted and accepted it. Highway surveyors
have no authority so to accept a road: IR.
County commissioners can only accept a road which they have ordered
to be built by a town, when acting together, and by a majority vote: Id.
If county commissioners 'in their specifications of the manner of con-
structing a road, have provided that "the gravel on the whole distance,
or any part thereof, must be on a regular inclined plane of not more than
twelve inches in twenty feet," and that the whole road be made "haid,
durable, safe, and convenient," the former stipulation is not qualified b'y
the latter; and it is not a sufficient compliance with the specifications, to
build a road which is' safe and convenient, if it is of -higher grade, than
that specified-:' Id.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
Wild Adnials-Liablity of Owners.-The liability of thle-owner or
keeper of an animal of any description for an injury committed by sueh ani-
mal, is founded upon negligence, actual or presumed: Scribner vs. Kelley.
It is not in itself unlawful for a person to keep wild beasts, though
they may be such as are of a nature fierce, dangerous, and irreclaimable;
From the Ion. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in the 38th volume of his
Reports.
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but the propensity of such animals to do dangerous mischief being iuhe
rent and well known, the owner or keeper is required to exercise such a
degree of care iu regard to them as will absolutely prevent the occurrence
of an injury to others, through such vicious acts of the animal as he is
naturally inclined to commit: Ml.
Where an injury happened to the plaintiff, in consequence of his horse
taking fright at an lephant passing llong the highway in the charge of a
keeper, prior to the passage of the Act of April 2d, 1862, regulating the
vae of public highways: Beld, that to render the owners of the animal
liable, it would be necessary to show, not ofily that such is the effect of the
appearance of an elephant upon horses in general, but also that the owners
knew or had notice of it: 11.
,Shtcr- -Liability for veglect of Dutg-Assguabilt9 of Clam-insol-
rency of Debtor.-Taking the body -of a debtor in execution is the highest
form of satisfaction of a judgment. Hence, the neglect of a sheriff to
arrest the debtor, upon an execution issued against his person, is a wrong
to the property, rights, or interests of the judgment-creditor, which would
survive to his executors or administrators, and is therefore assignable:
)ivinney vs. Fay, late Sherif.
A wrongdoer is liable to the executor or administrator of the person
injured, id an action for a neglect of duty, whether the wrongdoer was
benefited by the wrong or otherwise: II.
In an action on the case against a sheriff. forneglecting to take the
body of a defendant in execution, the sheriff should be allowed, by way
of mitigating damages, to prove the pecuniary circumstances and con-
dition of the defendant in the execution: Id.I
.Husband and 1TiVf.-A married woman living with her husband, and
having no separate estate, cannot in the absence of her husband, and with.
out his knowledge or consent., enter into an agreement in writing for the
purchase of real estate on credit: Ruse vs. Bell & Wfe.
Such an agreement being a mere nullity, the possession of the premises
is. in law, the possession of the husband, and in no respect thatof the
wife. She is, therefore, improperly joined with her husband in an action
by the vendor to recover the possession of the premises for a default in
the payment of the purchase-money: Id
Public Offlers-l-Poqf of thir Appointment-Decision of an hiferior
Tribunal as to jurist;ctional Iacts-Eletion of Trustees of School Dis-
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td'ts- Tax- 1'arraws.-Proof that an individual is represented to be, and-
has acted, notoriously, as a public officer, is primfa fircie evidence of his
official character, without producing his appointment: Colton vs. Bearlslcy.
In an action against a person for doing an act which lie has no right to
do unless an officer, he must show that he was 2rin4t fiacie an officer de
j,,,re. Proof of acting as such under color of authority, and of reputation,
is admissible evidence for that purpose, and, if proved, is sufficient in a
collateral proceeding to establish that character: Id.
Proof of a call by the trustees of a school district, for a special meeting
of the inhabitants, for the purpose of filling vacancies in the office of trus-
tee, of the assembling of the inhabitants under that call, the election of
two 1persons as trustees to fill vacancies, and of their entering upon the
duties of- the office, is proof of an election by the competent authority,
and constitutes the persons thus elected yrima facie trustees dejure: Id.
To defeat such primad facie title to the office, a party attacking it can-
not be allowed to give evidence, showing that no vacancy in the office of
trustee existed when the persons were chosen : Id. -
'The authority to call a special meeting to fill a vacancy in the office of
trustee being vested in the remaining trustees, and the power to fill it in
the'meeting when asseinbled under such a call, the act of the trustees in
calling the meeting, and of the meeting in filling the vacancy, are guasi
judicial acts: Id.
Hence, whether there was or was not a vacancy in fact, and if there
was, whether it had existed for over one month before the'election; and,
if it had, whether it arose from a cause which authorized it to be filled by
the -supervisor of the town, is immaterial in an action against the persons
elected, for an act done by them as trustees; those not being questions
which can be traversed in such an action: Id.
Matters of that nature can only be traversed in a diyeet proceeding to
set aside or quash the election. Until the election be so set aside or
quashed, the persons claiming to be elected are protected for all acts done
by virtue of the office held under color, of such election : ITd.
WThen the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon a fact, which
such tribunal is required to ascertain and determine by its decision, such
decision is final until reversed in a direct proceeding for that purpose: 11.
The test of jurisdiction in such cases, is whether the tribunal has
power to enter upon the inquiry, and not whether its conclusions in the
course of it were right or wrong: Id.
A general non-performance of the duties of an office is a refusal to
VOL. XI-86
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serve. A refusal to serve may be as clearly and strongly inferred from
the acts of an incumbent, as from a direct assertion that he will not dis-
charge the duties of the office: Id.
The insertion of an improper item in a tax-warrant issued by the
trustees of a school district will not vitiate the warrant, if otherwise valid)
or render the trustees liable in trespass. The warrant is void for th
excess only, and the trustees personally liable in'an action to recover back
any part of such excess paid or collected. But an action to recover the
value of the property sold on the warrant cannot be maintained: Id. '.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW YORK.1
Bill of Exclange--Notice of Dishonor-Residence of _Parties.-Where
a bill of exchange has been negotiated by the indorsement of several par-
ties, the holder has the next day after receiving notice of dishonor, to
notify any prior indorser whom he desires to charge; and each successive
indorser who receives notice, has at least one day thereafter to give notice
to any antecedent indorser: The West River Bank vs. Taylor.
This rule is not confined to holders for value. An agent or banker
intrusted with a bill to obtain acceptance or payment, is entitled to the
same time to give notice to his principal, and the principal is entitled,
after such notice, to the like time to notify any prior indorser as if he had
received notice from the true owner, instead of his banker or agent: Id.
Where the party thus giving the notice and the party to whom it is
given do not reside in the same town, the notice may be sent by mail: Id.
There is no rule requiring that an indorser residing in the same town
as the acceptor, shall be personally notified the next day after present-
ment,.where the banker, at whose instance the bill is protested, and to
whom notices of protest are sent, does not reside in that town : Id.
The fact that the true owner knows that the indorser resides in the
same place as the acceptor, does not, in such a case, entitle the indorsei
to notice on the day next after the presentment and protest: Id.
It is enough to charge him, that the true owner mails notice to him by
the first mail of the day next after that on which he, in due course, re-
ceives notice of dishonor, such. owner and indorser residing in different
towns: Id.
I From Hon. Joseph S. Bosworth, Chief Justice and Reporter; to appear in VoL
7 of his Reports.
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Vegotiable Pqper-Collateral Security- Good Faith.-A person who
takes negotiable paper as security for a loan made on the security thereof,
from one holding it for collection merely, and without authority to dispose
(if it, and takes it with knowledge of such circumstances as would excite
suspicion anJ lead a man of ordinary prudence to make inquiry, but
.nakes such inquiries as a man of ordinary prudence would make, and the
nformation he gets is such as would naturally be credited, and removes
A1 suspicion, he acts in good faith, and will acquire a title, so far as it
,lepends upon the question of good faith: Belmont Branch Bank vs.
7oge.
Where the loan, in such a case, is made in the State of New York to a
orporation, the true owner of the paper thus pledged cannot impeach the
tle of the lender and reclaim the paper, on the mere ground that the
wan was at more than seven per cent., where, apart from the force of the
faict that the loan was usurious, the lender is a bond fide holder for value.
(Ro ERTSON, J., dissented): Id
Curporations-Subscriber to Certificate filed to orgaifize a Bank-Suit
by Receiver of Insolvent Bailk-Assignment by Subscriber of his In-
t,.rest.-A subscriber to the certificate filed to organize a bank, is liable
to pay for the number of shares therein stated to have been subscribed
by him, and payment can be enforced at the suit of a receiver, appointed
oil its becoming insolvent, to satisfy the just demands of creditors of the
bank: Daylon vs. Borst.
In a suit by such receiver, against an original subscribei, d judgment
in favor of a third person against the bank, in a court of record,-in an
action in which the bank appeared and defended, isprim afacie evidence
that the bank owes the sum recovered: M.'
The fact that a subscriber assigns all his interest'in the bank, does-not
discharge his liability upon his subscription, and it can be enforced for
the benefit of one who subsequently becomes a creditor of the bank: hd
Corporations-Subscription to Stock-Assignment of certificate of
Shares'as Security, &c.-The defendant subscribed for 80 shares of the.
plaintiffs' capital stock, and afterwards, by his authority, other 66 shares
were subscribed for in his name, and certificates for the whole 146 shares
were issued to him; and as security for payment of his note for $2000,
he assigned 46 shares, and delivered, with the assignment, a certificate
for such shares, to a bank which became insolvent; and the receiver of
such bank sued the defendant and obtained judgment for the sum due on
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the note, and subsequently sold the 46 shares, and applied thc. proceeds
on the judgment; and the purchaser of the 46 shares applied to have
them transferred on the plaintiffs' books to him, when it was discovered
that 130 shares had already been transferred by the defendant in person,
or by attorney; whereupon the plaintiffs transferred to the purchaser 16
shares, and paid to him for the remaining 30 shares $301.25, the sum he
I '-d therefor, and took a surrender of the certificate; and defendant sub-
sequently, with knowledge of all the facts, promised to pay to the plain-
tiffs the said sum of $301.25; zeld, that he was bound by said promise,
and that an action would lie against him thereon, to recover the sum so
promised to be paid: St. Nicholas In. Co. vs. Bowa.
Election of Remedies.-In an action commenced in November, 1858,
by plaintiff against defendants, to recover proceeds of wool consigned in
the early part of 1858, by the former to the latter, for sale on the plain-
tiff's account, the defendants alleged in their answer that the wool was
the property of one A.; that prior to June 9, 1858, _.A employed B. as
his agent to purchase 20,000 lbs. of wool in Wisconsin and forward it to
Albany, agreeing to either pay B. half of the profits or one per cent. for
commission, as A. might elect; that between June 9 and July 14, A.
furnished B. $6000 and 105 sacks worth $52.50; that B. bought 7041 lbs.
at $2112.30, and sent it to A. with 34 sacks, worth $17; and with resi-
due of the money he bought wool in his own name, and assigned it (the
wool in question), with the other sacks, to the plaintiffs; that A. had
notified the defendants of the facts, and required the proceeds of the wool
to be paid to him; and it appeared that in July, 1858, A. brought suit
in the Supreme Court against B., and in his complaint alleged the same
facts; and that B. refused to return the residue of the sacks or deliver
the residue of the wool bought, or account for the moneys advanced to
him, and prayed judgment for the $6000 advanced, less the $2112.30, and
for the value of the sacks not returned, ana recovered a judgment there-
for February 14, 1860; and issued a ca. sa. thereon, on which B. was
arrested and imprisoned, and that such imprisonment continued up to the
time of the trial of the present action, June 14, 1860; it was held; that the
action by A. against B., and the recovery of judgment therein, estopped
A. from claiming property in the wool bought with the moneys for
which such judgment was recovered: Bank of Beloit vs. Beale.
That the bringing of the action by A., with knowledge of the facts, to
-ecover the residue of the $6000, and recovering judgment therefor, was
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an election by A. between remedies, by virtue of which A. repudiated
the use which B. made of the residue of the moneys as unauthorized, and
waived all claim of property in the wool bought, and that such facts were
a bar to the defence alleged in the answer of the present defendants: d.
.Held (by ROBERTSON, J.), that the suit of A. against B. was not an
election of remedies affecting his right to pursue the wool until that suit
had gone to judgment; and that as judgment therein was not recovered
until after issue joined in this action, the defence herein was valid, when
pleaded, and it was error to exclude proof of it at the trial - Id. "
held (by BOSWORTH, 0. J.). that as no such question was made by the
defendants at the trial, or raised on the argument of the appeal, and as
they did not object at the trial to proof being made of the fact of such
recovery by A. against B., but only to the character of the evidence
offered to establish it, no such question was presented by the appeal; and
that the only question was, whether the decision at the trial, as to the
effect of such suit and recovery, was correct: id.
H/eld, also, that such suit and recovery by A. againit B., and the tak-
ing of B.'s body in execution on the judgment, was a satisfaction of all
claims of A. pending such imprisonment: 1d.
Claim agaist a State-Judgment of a Board of State Officers hav-
ing legal authority to pass on such Claims will be Conclusive in Actions in
another State.-Where a claim against a State, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a decision that it is just, and of the amount thereof, is presented be-
fore a Board of Officers of said State, which Board is created by the
Constitution and Laws of such State, and vested with jurisdiction to hear
and determine such claim, and such claim is allowed, the decision is to
be regarded as a judgment of a competent judicial tribunal ; and in an
action afterwards brought in a Court of Equity, in another State, to
recover back the money paid by the first-named State, in pursuance of
such decision, it will be held conclusive, notwithstanding proofs, which
show that there was no original liability to the claimant for the claim so
allowed; and such decision can only be impeached by proof of fraud in
procuring the same: The People of Michigan vs. The Pwxnix Bank.
Where the claim on the State was for an advance by the claimant (to
a person assuming to act on behldf of the State) of drafts on banks situ-
ated therein, holding funds of the claimant, the amount of which drafts
never came to the use of the State, and the advance of which the State
never authorized (one of which was never paid, and the other was paid
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to a third bank); and the claimant had allowed his agent in that behalf
(with the assent of one of the State officers, given with the reservation
that the liability of the State should not be thereby admitted nor affected),
to receive from such banks choses in action and other property in full
settlement and payment, but to be held by him for the claimant or for
the State, whichsoever might assume or be *charged with the debt; of
which settlement the State; through its Legislature and its State officers,
had full notice; the decision of the said Board, created by the State, is
to be taken as conclusive that notwithstanding these facts the claimant is
entitled to recover; and although prior to the trial and decision by that
Board, such agent and trustee, with the assent of the claimant, has coi-
lected from such choses in action a part of the amount due thereon, and
converted others into other property, and the claimant has settled with
him, taken a transfer of a part of the property (being that received from
one of such banks), and released him from all liability, the omission of
the claimant to apprise the State of such dealings and release, and the
concealment by the claimant, on presenting his claim before such Board,
of such dealings and release of the agent and trustee, though such con-
cealment be practised in the belief that if known the claim would be
disallowed, and though practised in order to obtain the allowance of the
claim, are not a fraud sufficient to impeach the decision of the Board
in favor of the claimant and entitle the State to recover back the money
paid in pursuance of the decision and in ignorance of the facts thus con-
cealed. (WooDRUF, J., dissented): Id.
In such case, knowledge by the State of the said settlements with the
banks, and that the said agent and trustee held the said choses in action
and other property in trust for the purposes aforesaid, is sufficient to put
the State upon inquiry as to the then situation of the trust fund; and if
by due diligence the facts might have been discovered and proved by the
examination of witnesses, it is the fault of the State that the faets were
not proved before the Board, and the claimant by omitting to give notice
thereof to the State, and failing to disclose them to the B6ard (though
with the intent and belief aforesaid), violated no duty and committed no
fraud which entitles the State to impeach the judgment and recover back
the money paid thereon in ign6rance of such facts. (WoODRUFF, J., dis-
seated) : Id.
Mortgage- Unexpired Lease-Mistake-Deed by Executors-Implied
Covenants in (onveyances.-In a suit to foreclose a mortgage given to
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seeure the purchase-money agreed to be paid for the mortgaged premises,
where no covenant in the deed is broken and there has been no fraud on
the part of the grantors, it is no defence that a part of the premises at
the time of the grant and mortgage, was incumbered by an unexpired
lease thereof: Sandjbrd vs. Travers.
Where there is a mutual mistake as to a material fact for which a Court
of equity would relieve, a party desiring relief on that ground must, on
dis overing the mistake, offer to rescind: Id.
A deed by executors, as such, with a covenant against their own aetsB,
cannot be construed as containing an implied covenant that their testator
was scised of an estate in fee simple ; or a covenant on their part to put
the purchaser in possession : Id.
No covenant can be implied in any conveyance of real estate, whether
such conveyance contains special covenants or not: Id.
Neglijence-Liuibilty of Contractor.-'Where a person employs another
to do a piece of work, and the one so employed does it by his own work-
men, using his own discretion as to the manner of doing it, having ex-
elusive control of the matter, and a third person is injured while the work
is in progress, by the careless manner in which it is done, the contractor
and his servants guilty'of the negligence are alone liable for the injury:
O'Rourke vs. HUart.
It makes no difference, in such a ease, that the work done consists in
altering a public street. When the work to be done cannot itself be
dangerous to others, unless it becomes so by the dangerous or unskilful
manner of executing it, and is done by one contracting to do it, and hav-
ing exclusive control of the men employed, and injury results from such
unskilfulness, the remote principal is not liable. The liability is confined
to the persons guilty of the negligence, and to their principal: Id.
Surety-rariation of Contract without knowledge of Surec.-Where,
by a sealed contract between two persons, one is to serve the other in a
specified business for a term of years, at a fixed sum per annum, and the
laborer as part of the arrangement. gives a bond with 'surety to the em-
ployer, conditioned for the performance by the lab6rer of the contract on
his part, and subsequently a verbal contract is made and acted upon be-
tween the employer and laborer by which the latter is to receive compen-
sation graduated by the amount of work he may perform, and this is done
without the knowledge or consent of tle surety, the latter is disc'arged:
Baley vs. Clark.
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Where, after the contract has been made and the bond executed and
delivered, the employer forms a partnership with third persons, and the
laborer, by verbal agreement between him and the firm, contracts to serve
the firm, and pursuant to such agreement does subsequently serve the
firm for nearly two years, upon a different agreement as to compensation,
the sealed contract and bond are thereby abandoned and superseded, and
no action will lie thereon for an alleged breach occurring after such a term
of service under the new arrangement: Id.
Slipping-Bill of Lading-Purchase of Goods in Transiti- Claim
for Freight.-The master of a vessel, who signs a bill of lading by which
he acknowledges the receipt, on board, of goods, of a designated kind
and a specified quantity, and agrees to deliver the same to the shipper or
his assigns, on payment of freight, at a specified rate per ton, is bound to
deliver to one purchasing the goods in transitu and taking from the ship-
per, an assignment of the bill of lading, in good faith, and relying thereon,
goods of the kind so designated, and the specified quantity thereof: Byrne
vs. Wee/cs.
An acceptance of goods of the designated kind, but less than the spe-
cified quantity thereof, after discovering that there are more goods of one
designated kind and less of another on board than the bill of lading calls
for, but the same aggregate quantity in all, does not absolve the master
from the liability contracted by the bill of lading, nor impose upon such
an assignee of it a duty to take more of one kind or accept less of another,
than the bill of lading specifies: Id.
Where, in such a case, after a part delivery, the master refused to make
a further delivery, unless the assignee would accept a delivery of all the
goods on board as a performance of the carrier's contract, which the as-
signee declined to do, and the master thereupon sued the assignee and
recovered judgment for the whole freight; issued execution thereon, and
caused the goods remaining on board to be levied on as the defendant's
property, and to be removed and stored, and they were subsequently sold
by the depositary to satisfy his claim for storage, and at such sale they
were purchased by such assignee-the master thereby loses his lien on
the goods so levied on for freight; and the assignee obtaining possession
as such a purchaser, does not obtain a delivery under the bill of lading,
and is not liable for the freight of such goods-they having been so
bought in ignorance of any claim or lien thereon in favor of the master
for freight : Id.
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SUPREME COURT OEL MICHIGAN.'
Land Oontract-Failure to "improve," and to pay Taxes-Evidence
of Litention of endor to rescild-Compound Interest, where T encdee in.
Default asks Specific Pe'.formance.-The failure of the vendee to tender
performance and demand a deed before filing a bill for the specific per-
formance of a contract for the sale and conveyance of lands, only affects
the question of costs: .lforris vs. _loyt.
A stipulation in such a contract, that the vendee shall "improve the
premises," but specifying neither the kind nor extent of the improve-
ments, is so indefinite that the intention of the parties cannot be known;
and on a bill for specific performance, it will be treated as immaterial: P.
A failure of the vendee to pay the taxes as stipulated in such a con-
tract, stands upon the same basis, as respects specific performance, as a
default in the payment of instalments of the purchase-money : Id.
A provision in such a contract, that on failure by the vendee to fulfil
the agreements on his part at the time specified, the vendor may re-enter
and take possession of the land, and all rights of the vendee under the
contract shall be null and void, and all payments and improvements made
by him shall be forfeited, does not make time so far of the essence of the
contract, as that all rights of the vendee become ipso ficto forfeited
merely by a failure to pay at the times agreed upon, without any act on
the part of the vendor indicating an intention to insist upon the for-
feiture: Id.
Under such a provision, the only mode by which the vendor can forfeit
the righ s of the vendee, is by re-entering and taking possession of the
land, or some act equivalent thereto : Rd.
Where a vendee seeks the specific performance of a contract after
default in the payment of instalments of principal and interest, he will be
required to pay interest on the instalments of interest from the time they
fell due: M.
Constition d aq e--ontrol of Detroit City over Ferries to tM6 Cana(
Shore, vot an interference with the, 1owor qf Congrcse ocer Commerce.-
The Ordinance of the City of Detroit., requiring ferry-boats running to the
Canada slore to pay a license-fee, and imposing a penalty for its violation,
is not unconzzituti.,nal as an interference with the power of Congress over
commerce. And the master of a boat, enrolled and licensed under the
I From Non. T. M. Cooley, Reporter; to appear in 11 MIichigan Reports.
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acts, of Congress for the coasting and foreign trade, is liable to the penalty
for running it as a ferry-boat without first obtaining a license from the
city: Ohelvers vs, Beople.
Us-try a personal Defence.-Usury is a personal defence, to be made by
a party to the contract. One who has purchased lands subject to a mort-
gaige, cannot make this defence to the mortgage in a suit to foreclose it:
Sellers vs. Botsford.
Constitutional Lawc-'Due Process of Law"-Seller of Property can-
not purchase of Ehnself.-Unless in proceedings to collect the public
revenue, no person can legally be divested of his property without
remuneration or against his will, unless he is allowed a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, where he may contest the claim set up against him,
and be allowed to meet it on the law and the facts: Ames vs. The Port
Huron Log-Driving and Booming Co.
The statute for the formation of log-driving and booming companies, in
so far as it undertakes to authorize companies formed under it, without
any necessity arising fiom the obstruction of their own business, to
assume the control and management, on the public waters, of the logs of
unconsenting parties who have made insufficient provision for running
them, and to enforce compensation against the logs for thus controlling and
managing them, is unconstitutional:
1. It allows persons thus organizing to assume a police power over the
waters used, and thus to exercise a public office without either an election
or an appointment.
2. It deprives persons of their property without due process of law,
since under the statute the company or its agents must of necessity
determine when the case arises which justifies assuming such control,
and the company afterwards assesses its own charges, and proceeds to sell
the property to pay them: Id.
No one without express authority of law can become a purchaser of
property, which it is his duty to sell for the best price it will bring: 1d.
E'juify of Redemption in Chattels.-A mortgagor of chattels is entitled
to redeem in equity, at any time before the mortgagee has foreclosed by
reducing the property to possession, or by selling it under the power of
sale in the mortgage: Yan Brunt vs. Wakelee.
Sale of Chattel Interests in Lands on Execution.-Chattel interests in
lands are to be sold on execution as personal estate. The sale of an estate
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for years iii lands, made in accordance with the statutory provisions for
the sale of real estate, is void,: Buld vs. Kenyon.
Statute prohibiting Ejeetment on Mortgages-Bill to quiet Title by/
Party1 not in Possession.-The statute taking from mortgagees the right
to bring ejectment before foreclosure, is inoperative as to mortgages given
prior to its passage: Blackzwood vs. ran Vieet.
The fact that the statute allows two new trials in an action of eject-
ment, is no reason for the interposition of equity to try titles to land: Md.
Bill in equity was filed against one in possession of lands claiming
them under tax titles, to have these titles declared void; and complainant's
title to the lands quieted; and also for an injunction to restrain defendant
from the commission of waste. Complainant had not established his right
at law, and had brought no suit for that purpose. It was held that the
bill could not be sustained: 11.
Mortgage for Sums not specifed-Statute of Limitations and Lapse
of Thne.-A mortgage given to secure all existing debts of the mort-
gagor to the mortgagee, but not specifying their amount, is valid not only
against the mortgagor, but against subsequent purchasers with actual or
constructive notice: .Mi.chigan Insurance Co. vs. Brown.
The remedy by foreclosure of a mortgage, is not lost by an action at
law upon the debt becoming barred by the Statute of Limitations. The
equitable remedy may be pursued at any time before a presumption of
payment arises by the lapse of twenty years' time. And this presumption
differs from a limitation of action at law, in that it is not an absolute bar
to the remedy : Id.
Where an action at law upon the debt is barred, a Court of equity will
not, in a foreclosure suit, make a personal decree against the mortgagor.
But the mortragor is still a necessary party to the foreclosure suit : Id.
Damages fr .False kiprisonnct.-If one is arrested on a void execu-
tiou, and gives bond for the jail limits, the bond is void, and he cannot, in
an action for false imprisonment, recover damages for remaining on the
limits according to the terms of the bond : Fuller vs. Boicker.
Review of tMe Evidence on Ccrtirar.-On common law certiorari,
only questions of law are open. and the Court cannot weigh the evidence
to determine whether question., of fact have been correctly decided. It
is only w;'here there is an entire absence of iroof on some material fact.
